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1The uncertainty of market size is highlighted in the Intuit example. Intuits chief executive officer, Scott Cook, estimated the potential market
for off-line home finance software in 1985 to be close to a $250,000 in California (see Forbes, November 11, 1984); while, the market potential
in 1995 is $7 million (San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1995). Two aspects are to be noted in this example:  first, there is a potential of
increase in market size for software products, and second, the knowledge of this potential creates an option value, which can be incorporated
in software design.
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Abstract
This work extends earlier work on software upgrades as well as  research on real options and IT investment.
We consider a two-period model with one software provider who develops and releases a software product to
the market. The result shows that the profit from the upgrade policy increases when the market size uncertainty
increases. The option value of upgrade is higher when there is more market uncertainty. Also, the value of
investing in design effort is more when the development cost is low.
1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to gain insights into a software providers incentives to offer software upgrades using the theory
of real options. One of the features of software that is fundamentally different from commodity products is that the option of
designing and offering upgrades for software is relatively easier than for commodity products (see Raghunathan 2000). The
software provider can use this feature to enhance profits by planning software design such that upgrades are offered when market
uncertainty is sufficiently resolved (Dixit and Pindyck 1993; Trigeorgis 1997). While the uncertainty of market size is the driving
force behind real options, we examine how the cost of software development and the cost of designing upgrades interact with the
uncertainty of market size to affect the value of real options.1  Typically, with commodity products, the customer has to buy the
new upgraded product as a whole, while with software products, customers can buy incremental upgrades and incorporate them
into the existing product.  In essence, software providers can use software upgrades as a mechanism that enables them to extract
real option value. This work extends earlier work on software upgrades such as Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) as well as research
on real options and IT investment such as Benaroch and Kauffman (2000) and Sullivan et al. (1999).
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2We do not consider the cost reducing effect of design effort on the variable cost term, . While this may be reasonable in some212 qbq
situations, the inclusion of this effect makes the model very complex to analyze. We are currently investigating this issue.
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2 THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model with one software provider who develops and releases a software product to the market. At the
beginning of the first period, the software provider obtains the information on both  , the market size in the first period, and ,1x 2x
the additional market size in the second period.  Specifically, it knows the value of  and obtains a noisy signal on with mean1x 2x
: and standard deviation F.  We assume the providers noisy signal on is uniformly distributed on the interval2x
with  and . The provider determines the number of features (measured using a standard metric) ,( ςµςµ +− 3/ςσ = µ ς>
such as function points) offered in the initial product ( ) and the incremental features in period 2 ( ). Thus, the product has1q 2q
features  in period 1 and ( + ) in period 2. In addition, at the beginning of period 1, the provider chooses to exert a product1q 1
q
2q
design effort, y that can reduce the cost of future upgrades. However, the design effort y does not reduce the first period
development cost. The cost of design effort y is where M is the fixed cost.2ayM +
Consistent with prior literature (Moorthy and Png 1992; Padmanabhan et al. 1996), the cost of developing software is assumed
to be  in period 1 where b represents how expensive it is to develop the software features and  is the fixed cost.211 bqK + 1K
Thus the investment by the provider in the first period ( ) is made up of the direct development cost and the cost of product1C
design effort, i.e., . Similarly, the investment in the second period ( ) is made up of the direct2 21 1 1C K bq M ay= + + + 2C
cost of creating an upgrade, i.e.,   if the software provider decides to offer an upgrade21
2
2122 )() 1( bqqqbyKC −++−= β
and is zero otherwise. The first term,  captures the benefit of exerting product design effort y in period 1. Examplesy) 1(2 β−K
of product design effort in period 1 that help decrease the future upgrade costs are:  more effort in system analysis and design in
the first period in anticipation of future upgrades, better design of modules and functions in the first period, and more detailed
documentation.2 
The customers are homogeneous and buy one unit of the product. The utility per unit per period is given by for periodii XQ α+
i, where  is the value of software for period i, i.e.,  and . The network benefit that is derived is iQ 11 qQ = 212 qqQ += iα X
with denoting the number of customers using the software in period i. The new software is backward compatible with theiX
existing software, in the sense that a user of the old software receives the network benefit from the users of the old software; a
user of the new software receives the benefit from both user groups, i.e.,  and . Each customer incurs11 xX = 212 xxX +=
cost c the first time he starts to use the software in both periods and an additional cost if the customer in period 1 buys theuc
upgrade in the second period. We let product design effort y also reduce the learning cost with respect to upgrades, i.e.,uc
.  We assume that the provider and the customers have the same discount factor *. ) 1(0 yccu γ−=
3 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The provider charges a price  for the base product, for the new product, and for the upgrade. The profit for the provider1P 2P uP
in period 1 is and in period 2, the expected profit is if the provider offers the1111 CxP −=π )()( 21222 CxPxPEE u −+=π
upgrade. The total profit is . If the provider offers the same product in period 2, then and .)( 21 πδπ E+ 21 PP = 0=uP
Ji et al./Real Options and Software Upgrades
3The providers market research information is disseminated to customers through articles in trade journals and advertising.
4The value of depends on the existing customer coordination rules. Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) discussed two upgrade selection rules:up
the reluctant and the eager rules. in the eager upgrade case is higher than that in the reluctant case. However, the discounted paymentup
by the existing customers is independent of . The reason behind that result is because the higher upgrade prices are offset by lower first-up
period prices as the period 1 customers already expect the future payment for the upgrade.
2002  Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems 699
We analyze two cases:  (1) the benchmark case where the provider does not provide any upgrades, i.e., , and  (2) the02 =q
upgrade case where the provider offers upgrade, i.e., . And we assume that the customers have the same knowledge about02 >q
the market size as the provider.3
The benchmark case corresponds to the situation in which the software provider commits to offering the same product in two
periods and the upgrade case corresponds to the situation in which it offers the upgrade. Further we assume that so thatαµ<uc
it is optimal for the provider to offer the upgrade part (see Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). We proceed by examining the benchmark
case.
3.1 Benchmark Case
When the software provider offers no upgrades, i.e., , the total expected utility of the two periods for a customer who buys02 =q
the product in period 1 is .And the new customers utility in period 2 iscxqu −⋅⋅+⋅++= µαδαδ ))(1( 11
.cxxqu −++= )( 212 α
The provider sets the prices at  and  in periods 1 and 2 to extract all customer surplus. Using the optimal prices, the expected1u 2u
profit for the provider in period 1 is
( ) ( )[ ]














Maximizing the providers expected profit ( ) with respect to q, we get the optimum solution as)(qπ





In this case, the software provider can offer  in the first period and if the market turns out to be favorable in the second period,1q
that is, more new customers come in, then it can offer the new software with the incremental value of , together with the2q
upgraded part for the old software. 
The new customers utility is the same as before since the new software is compatible with the old software even if the existing
customers stick with the old software. By offering the upgrade part at a price , the provider can induce the old customers toup
upgrade.4  Following the same track as before, the software provider extracts all of the customers surplus and his expected profit
is given by
Ji et al./Real Options and Software Upgrades
5The second-order conditions are given in the appendix. They are used to prove propositions 1 and 2.
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where is the investment at the beginning of the second period.  is the threshold of the new market size at which the2C 20x
provider will break even by developing and offering the new software. If turns out to be higher than , then the provider2x 20x
will develop the new software. Otherwise, the provider will continue to offer the old software to the new customers.  Let

















Setting , and solving for , we have 0=h 20x
(2)( )( )byKxcqbxx u /)1((2)( 211201 ⋅−++=+ β

























2 20210 xKxcay −++⋅= ςµβγς
δ
We present two propositions about the properties of , y and , showing how they depend on important parameters such as20x 1q
b and F. 
Proposition 1 (See Appendix for proof)
(1) The threshold market size  for providing an upgrade increases with b, i.e., .20x 020 >db
dx
(2) The design effort y decreases with b, i.e., . 0<
db
dy
As b increases, it is more expensive to develop software. The result shows that when it is more expensive to develop software,
upgrades will be offered only if the market size has grown considerably. This is in line with our intuition. However, the surprising
Ji et al./Real Options and Software Upgrades
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result of this proposition is . When it is more expensive to develop the software features, then it should become relatively0<
db
dy
cheaper to put effort y in building better upgrade infrastructure. We would anticipate more effort y. So,  would be positive.
db
dy
But it is not so. This seemingly counter-intuitive result occurs because the threshold of the market size  increases. Since 20x 20x
increases, the benefit from the product design effort decreases. This in turn leads to decreased product design effort. Overall, the
result shows that the cost of software development and product design effort are complements and not substitutes. 
It is also interesting to study the effect of increasing market uncertainty F on , y and . While we can not determine the signs20x 1q







market size, i.e.,  and we let the standard deviation vary without affecting the expected additional market size, i.e., Fµ<20x
is independent of :.  We state these as assumption A1:
A1:  and F is independent of :.µ<20x
The following proposition provides some observations on the behavior of the product design effort y and the features in period
1, . 1q
Proposition 2 (See Appendix for proof):  When A1 is satisfied, 






(2) If the threshold market size decreases with F, then the amount of the initial product features  also decreases with F, i.e.,1q






Proposition 2 provides some useful insights. Under the condition of , when product design effort y decreases as marketµ<20x
uncertainty F increases, then  will also decrease. The behavior of y and  with regard to F is thus different from the20x 20x
behavior with respect to b. We illustrate the results with a numerical example. For purpose of the example, we use the following
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Figure 1.  Impact of b and F on Increased Profit
Figure 1 shows the percentage increased profit of the upgrade case over the benchmark case. The increased profit (%) is calculated
by using . The figure shows that the profit from the upgrade policy increases when the market size%100/)( ×− πππ
uncertainty increases. The option value of upgrade is higher when there is more market uncertainty, as is generally true with call
options (see  Dixit and Pindyck 1993). We have also examined the impact of b and F on the upgrade threshold  and the initial20x
software features . The results are the following:  (1) For fixed F, as b increases, y decreases, and  increases.  (2) For fixed1q 20x












One of the key findings of this study is that under the presence of demand uncertainty, the optimal amount of design effort
decreases with development cost. As development cost increases, the threshold level of demand required to offer a profitable
upgrade also increases. Thus, the probability of offering the upgrade (and hence recovering the investment on design) reduces
when the development cost increases. In most situations, development cost would increase with the complexity of an application.
The above finding highlights the importance of including demand uncertainty and application complexity in the economics of
software design. 
This study is a first-step in the analysis of the economic forces that make software upgrades a mechanism for expropriating real
option value. By considering heterogeneous customers, future work will include aspects of the market segmentation theory in
addition to the real options theory. Other issues to include are competition among software providers and differences between
initial development cost and upgrade cost.
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For optimal y and  to maximize the profit, the Hessian matrix should be negative definite. That is, 1q










































Where . We can have ,  and (A.1).4211 TTT ++−=∆ 0)1( 4 >− T ,0<∆ 0)1( 21 <+− TT
Proof of Proposition 1:





, we have: , ,
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Proof of Proposition 2 (Sketch)
Similarly, take the derivative of equations (2), (3), and (4) with respect to H  and solve the obtained linear equations for  ,
ςd
dy


























Using the equations in (A.1), we can prove Proposition 2 easily. Notice that .  Q. E. D. 3/ςσ =
